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more government programs, a cleaner environment) than 
could be met. 
chairman of the Federal Reserve Board from 
1979 to 1987, forged an accidental alliance that 
was largely unspoken, impersonal, and mis­
understood. There was no particular personal 
chemistry between the men. Nor was there any 
explicit bargain-you do this, and I'll do that. 
Although Reagan supported Volcker, many offi­
cials in his administration openly criticized him. 
Even while the alliance flourished, it sometimes 
seemed a mirage. 
When Ronald Reagan won in a near landslide-50.7 
percent of the popular vote against Carter's 41 percent­
inflation was the dominating concern. Voters didn't know 
that Reagan could control it; but they did know that Carter 
couldn't. Later, Carter himself judged that inflation had 
been the decisive issue against him, more important than 
his mishandling of the Iranian hostage crisis. Exit polls 
showed that 47 percent of Reagan's voters rated "control­
ling inflation" as the most important issue, followed closely 
by 45 percent who valued "strengthening America's position 
in the world." In the Gallup Poll in September, 58 percent 
rated inflation as the No.1 problem. 
How Inflation Was Subdued 
The subjugation of inflation was principally the accom­
plishment of two men: Paul Volcker and Ronald Reagan. 
If either had been absent, the story would have unfolded 
differently and, from our present perspective, less favor­
ably. Reagan, president from 1981 to 1989, and Volcker, 
But the alliance was genuine, a compact of 
conviction. Both men believed that high infla­
tion was shredding the fabric of the economy 
and of American society. The country could not 
thrive if it persisted. Buttressed by these beliefs, 
they broke with the past. Each had a role to play, 
and each played it somewhat independently of 
the other. 
The Fed's IInse 
How the Federal Reserve engineered 
the most dramatic peacetime 
experiment in monetary and fiscal 
stimulus in U.S. history without 
anyone noticing 
Jeffrey Rogers Hummel 
UP UNTIL SEPTEMBER, Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke effectively steril­
ized all his financial crisis-fueled mon­
etary injections, either by directly trading 
Treasury bills for riskier financial securi­
ties or by indirectly loaning to financial 
institutions with money recouped by 
selling Fed-held Treasuries on the open 
market. Either way, there was no major 
impact on the monetary base. As a result, 
the annual rate of growth of the monetary 
base remained in the neighborhood of 2 
percent through August, with total bank 
reserves remaining virtually constant. 
But after September 17, when the 
interest on T-bills briefly went negative, 
Bernanke opened the monetary flood-
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Volcker took a sledgehammer to inflation­
ary expectations. He raised interest rates, tight­
ened credit, and triggered the most punishing 
gates. In August the monetary base had 
been $847 billion, with total reserves 
constituting $72 billion of that. (None 
of these figures are seasonally adjusted 
or adjusted for changes in reserve 
requirements.) A Fed press release on 
October 22 put the base at $1.149 tril­
lion, a shocking 40 percent jump over the 
previous year. What has exploded even 
more is total bank reserves, where the 
base increase is concentrated. Reserves 
increased by an astonishing factor of five 
over the course of just one month, and as 
of late October were somewhere between 
$343 and $358 billion. 
And that's not all. Federal Reserve 
Bank credit also doubled to around $1.8 
trillion. Although Fed credit once closely 
mirrored the monetary base, that is true 
no longer-not since the Fed activated 
its U.S. Treasury supplementary financ­
ing account in the fall. This boosted 
additional Treasury deposits from zero 
to approximately $560 billion. The new 
deposits resulted from what the Trea­
sury calls its Supplementary Financing 
Program, initiated in September to try to 
staunch the growing demand for Treasury 
securities manifested in fallingT-bill 
rates. 
Essentially, the Treasury is now issu­
ing extra securities to borrow money from 
the economy, then loaning the money to 
the Fed in these special deposits so that 
Bernanke can re-inject it to make his bail­
out purchases of various securities, all 
without increasing the monetary base. ln 
other words, what the infamous bailout 
act permitted the Treasury to do directly 
is something it had already started doing 
indirectly through the Fed to the tune of 
half a trillion. All in the name of easing a 
tight Treasury market. 
This means that the total bailout 
is not the $700 billion that Congress 
appropriated, but at least $1.2 trillion. 
And that figure doesn't include the Fed's 
mid-October promise of $540 billion to 
bail out money market funds, which if not 
covered by the Fed's sale of other assets, 
will require either further monetary 
increases or further Treasury borrow-
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economic slump since the 1930s. In December 
1980, banks' "prime rate" (the loan rate for the 
worthiest business borrowers) hit a record 21.5 
percent. Mortgage and bond rates rose in concert. 
By the summer of 1981, consumers had trouble 
borrowing for homes and cars. Many companies 
couldn't borrow for new investment. Industrial 
production dropped 12 percent from mid-1981 
until late 1982. In many industries, declines were 
steeper. In autos, it was 34 percent (from June 
1981 to January 1982), and in steel it was 56 per­
cent (from August 1981 to December 1982). By 
1982 the numberofbusiness failures had tripled 
from 1979. Construction starts of new homes 
in 1982 were 40 percent below the 1979 level. 
Worse, unemployment exploded. By late 1982, it 
was 10.8 percent, which remains a post-World 
War II record. 
have, had he been re-elected, nor would his chief Demo­
cratic rival, Sen. Edward M.Kennedy (D-Mass.). Both would 
have faced intense pressures from the party's faithful, led 
by unionized workers-especially auto- and steelworkers­
who were big victims ofVolcker's austerity. Nor is it likely 
that any of the major Republican presidential contenders 
in 1980 would have acquiesced, including George H.W. 
Bush, Howard Baker, and John Connally. Reagan's initial 
economic program promised to reduce the money supply 
to curb inflation. He was the first president to make that 
part of his agenda, and he never retreated from it. As the 
economy deteriorated, he kept quiet. He refused to criticize 
Volcker publicly, to urge a lowering of interest rates, or to 
work behind the scenes to bring that about. 
When the president did speak, he supported Volcker. 
It is doubtful that, aside from Reagan, any 
other potential president would have let the Fed 
proceed unchallenged. Certainly Carter wouldn't 
At a press conference on February 18, 1982-with unem­
ployment near 9 percent-Reagan called inflation "our No. 
1 enemy" and referred to fears that "the Federal Reserve 
Board will revert to the inflationary monetary policies of 
the past.'' The president pledged that this wouldn't happen. 
"I have met with Chairman Volcker several times during 
in g. Thus we now have the worst of both 
worlds: a massive bailout financed both 
by Treasury borrowing (in order to avoid 
inflation) and a Federal Reserve increase
of the monetary base (which heralds 
future inflation anyway). 
Of the $1.2 trillion increase in federa
government borrowing, at least half took
place within the space of a month. This 
sudden 25 percent increase in the out­
standing national debt qualifies as the 
most dramatic peacetime experiment in 
fiscal stimulus the U.S. government has 
ever implemented. If Keynesian theory 
were correct, the economy should have 
been well beyond the reach of any poten
tial recession by the end of October. 
But how many economists are going 
to acknowledge this striking empirical 
refutation of the fiscal policy they hold 
dear? 
This enormous increase in govern­
ment debt may at least partly explain 
the sudden stock market collapse after 
the bailout passed. Government borrow­
ing represents a future tax liability, and 
 
l 
 
­
expected future taxes affect the value 
of equities. Some argue that this new 
borrowing may not increase taxes at all 
because it merely finances the purchase 
of earning assets that the government 
can later resell. While that's certainly 
possible in the long run, no one knows 
the true value of those assets in the short
run. After all, the market's anxiety about 
their worth was the justification for the 
bailout in the first place. So now the gov­
ernment is transferring that uncertainty 
from private financial institutions to the 
taxpayers. 
Meanwhile, there will be a lag before 
the broader measures of the money sup­
ply feel the effects of the Fed's money 
bomb. The year-to-year annual growth 
rate of M1-currency in circulation plus 
checking accounts-had already risen 
from o percent to over 7 percent as of late 
October, whereas that of M2 (Ml money 
plus other types of deposits and most 
money market funds) is up slightly from 
6 to 7 percent. But as centuries of experi­
ence has shown, an increasing money 
 
supply will inexorably lead to increasing 
inflation. 
Bernanke is betting that he can 
reverse the process before inflation gets 
out of hand. But that will require the Fed 
dumping billions worth of securities it 
has recently purchased back on the mar­
ket. It is anybody's guess when Bernanke 
will judge that the financial system is 
sound enough for him to do so. All the 
emergency initiatives of both the Fed and 
the Treasury since the subprime problem 
first emerged have not merely proved 
stellar and consistent failures. As Anna 
Schwartz, Milton Friedman's esteemed 
co-author, and other economists have 
suggested, the thrashing about of Fed 
and Treasury policy has undoubtedly 
made the financial situation worse. The 
prospects do not look promising. li 
Jeffrey Rogers Hummel is an economics profes­
sor at San Jose State University and the author 
of Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men: 
A History of the American Civil War (open 
Court). 
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